Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Cappelen,H/Dever,J, Numenius and John Gray

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32 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 7. Despair over Philosophy
Human knowledge may not produce well-being; the examined life may not be worth living [Gray]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 9. Naturalised Epistemology
Knowledge does not need minds or nervous systems; it is found in all living things [Gray]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 2. Knowing the Self
Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever]
We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever]
Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
The will hardly ever does anything; most of our life just happens to us [Gray]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever]
Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever]
If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever]
All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever]
You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever]
Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever]
Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever]
All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever]
19. Language / F. Communication / 5. Pragmatics / a. Contextual meaning
The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever]
It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 2. Acting on Beliefs / b. Action cognitivism
We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Nowadays we identify the free life with the good life [Gray]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 4. Ecology
Over forty percent of the Earth's living tissue is human [Gray]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 1. God
There is a remote first god (the Good), and a second god who organises the material world [Numenius, by O'Meara]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
Free atheism should start by questioning its faith in humanity [Gray]
29. Religion / A. Polytheistic Religion / 4. Dualist Religion
Gnosticism has a supreme creator God, giving way to a possibly hostile Demiurge [Gray]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 2. Judaism
Judaism only became monotheistic around 550 BCE [Gray]
29. Religion / B. Monotheistic Religion / 4. Christianity / a. Christianity
Without Christianity we lose the idea that human history has a meaning [Gray]
What was our original sin, and how could Christ's suffering redeem it? [Gray]
Christians introduced the idea that a religion needs a creed [Gray]
29. Religion / C. Spiritual Disciplines / 3. Buddhism
Buddhism has no divinity or souls, and the aim is to lose the illusion of a self [Gray]